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DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK N.V.
AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
STATE OF ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

In the Matter of
FRB Dkt. No. 05-035-B-FB
ABN AMRO BANK N.V.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABN AMRO BANK N.V.
NEW YORK BRANCH
New York, New York

Order to issue a Direction
(in Dutch, “Besluit tot het geven van
een aanwijzing”);
Order to Cease and Desist
Issued Upon Consent

ABN AMRO BANK N.V.
CHICAGO BRANCH,
Chicago, Illinois

WHEREAS, De Nederlandsche Bank (“DNB”) is the home country supervisor of
ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands (“ABN AMRO”), a Netherlands bank;
WHEREAS, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Board
of Governors”) is the host country supervisor in the United States of ABN AMRO, which is both
a foreign bank as defined in section 3101(7) of the International Banking Act (12 U.S.C.
§ 3101(7)), including its New York Branch and its Chicago Branch (collectively, the
“Branches”), and a registered bank holding company;

WHEREAS, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation,
Division of Banking (the “IDFPR”), pursuant to the authority provided under Section 3 of the
Foreign Banking Office Act, (205 ILCS 645/1 et seq.) supervises and has examination authority
over the foreign banking office maintained by ABN AMRO in the state of Illinois;
WHEREAS, the New York State Banking Department (the “NYSBD”) is the
licensing agency of the New York Branch of ABN AMRO, pursuant to Article II of the New
York Banking Law (“NYBL”), and is responsible for the supervision and regulation thereof
pursuant to the NYBL;
WHEREAS, the Board of Governors, the NYSBD, the IDFPR (collectively, the
“U.S. Supervisors”), DNB (collectively with the U.S. Supervisors, the “Supervisors”), and ABN
AMRO have the common goal to ensure that ABN AMRO complies with United States federal
and state laws, rules and regulations wherever they are applicable within the United States or
across jurisdictional borders, that ABN AMRO fosters a strong commitment towards compliance
and has adequate compliance systems which cover in an appropriate manner all activities
concerning the United States, and that ABN AMRO effectively manages the financial,
operational, legal, reputational, and compliance risks of its operations in the United States;
WHEREAS, the U.S. Supervisors and ABN AMRO have mutually agreed to the
issuance of this combined Order to Cease and Desist Upon Consent against ABN AMRO and the
Branches, and DNB has decided to issue the Direction laid down in this Order to ABN AMRO
and the Branches (collectively, the “Order”);
WHEREAS, on July 23, 2004, ABN AMRO and the New York Branch entered
into a Written Agreement with the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Chicago
(collectively, the “Reserve Banks”), the IDFPR, and the NYSBD designed to correct deficiencies

at the New York Branch relating to anti-money laundering policies, procedures, and practices
(the “Written Agreement”), and ABN AMRO and the New York Branch have taken substantial
steps to rectify the deficiencies set forth in the Written Agreement and continue to take
additional steps;
WHEREAS, after execution of the Written Agreement, and in response to its
requirements, ABN AMRO discovered and provided additional information to the Supervisors
regarding a pattern of previously undisclosed unsafe and unsound practices warranting further
enforcement action. Specifically, based on the information submitted by ABN AMRO and other
information gathered by the Supervisors:
A.

ABN AMRO lacked adequate risk management and legal review policies and

procedures to ensure compliance with applicable U.S. law, and failed to adhere to those policies
and procedures that it did have. As a result, one of ABN AMRO’s overseas branches was able to
develop and implement “special procedures” for certain funds transfers, check clearing
operations, and letter of credit transactions that were designed and used to circumvent the
compliance systems established by the Branches to ensure compliance with the laws of the U.S.
In particular, the “special procedures” circumvented the Branches’ systems for ensuring
compliance with the regulations issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”)
(31 C.F.R. Chapter V). ABN AMRO failed to adequately review such “special procedures” to
determine whether the execution of the procedures was consistent with U.S. laws; and
B.

ABN AMRO lacked effective systems of governance, audit, and internal control

to oversee the activities of the Branches with respect to legal, compliance, and reputational risk,
and failed to adhere to those systems that it did have, especially those relating to anti-money
laundering policies and procedures, including the procedures to implement the Currency and

Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq. (the Bank Secrecy Act (the
“BSA”)); the rules and regulations issued thereunder by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (31
C.F.R. Part 103); and the suspicious activity reporting requirements of Regulation K of the
Board of the Governors (12 C.F.R. § 211.24(f)). As a result, ABN AMRO and the Branches:
(1) failed to adequately document, report, and follow up on negative findings from certain
internal audits; (2) failed to produce negative audit findings in a timely manner to the U.S.
Supervisors, and to appropriate internal governing bodies; (3) failed to follow-up on inquiries
referred to the New York Branch from overseas offices regarding compliance with U.S. law;
(4) overstated to internal auditors, compliance personnel, and the U.S. Supervisors the extent of
due diligence efforts undertaken by certain branches outside the United States with respect to
high risk correspondent banking customers; and (5) failed to escalate the “special procedures”
for review outside of the trade processing business or reporting line;
WHEREAS, to address the unsafe and unsound practices described above, ABN
AMRO must continue to implement improvements in its oversight and compliance programs
with respect to United States law in all countries in which ABN AMRO branches or affiliates do
business that is in whole or in part governed by United States law, and must undertake specific
additional measures to further improve oversight and compliance in the Branches and other U.S.
offices of ABN AMRO;
WHEREAS, the unsafe and unsound practices described above also warrant the
separate assessment of civil money penalties by the Board of Governors under section 8(i)(2)(B)
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B)) (the “FDI Act”),
the NYSBD pursuant to Section 44 of the NYBL, the IDFPR pursuant to the authority provided
under Section 18 of the Foreign Banking Office Act, (205 ILCS 645/1 et seq.) and Section 48 (8)

of the Illinois Banking Act, (205 ILCS 5/1 et seq.), OFAC, and the U.S. Department of the
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”);
Laws of The Netherlands
WHEREAS, DNB is entrusted with the task of supervising financial institutions
such as ABN AMRO pursuant to Section 4 of the Bank Act 1998 (in Dutch: “Bankwet 1998”)
and the Act on the Supervision of the Credit System 1992 (in Dutch: “Wet toezicht kredietwezen
1992”);
WHEREAS, DNB has concluded that the unsafe and unsound practices referred
to in A. and B. above also constitute failures to duly comply with the rules referred to in Sections
22 and 22a of the Act on the Supervision of the Credit System 1992 (in Dutch: Wet toezicht
kredietwezen 1992) and warrant the issuance of a direction (in Dutch: aanwijzing) under Section
28 of such Act on the course of action to be pursued by ABN AMRO in respect of the matters
specified in this Order; the course of action DNB requires ABN AMRO to take is set out in
Paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of this Order;
WHEREAS, the measures required by the Supervisors have been discussed with
ABN AMRO prior to the issuance of this Order, in conformity with the requirements of
Netherlands law. By countersigning this document, ABN AMRO confirms (i) that the decision
(in Dutch: besluit) to issue a direction (in Dutch: aanwijzing) has been sufficiently substantiated
within the meaning of sections 3:46 and 3:48 of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (in
Dutch: Algemene wet bestuursrecht), (ii) that it is aware of and understands each of the measures
it is required to take pursuant to this Order, and (iii) that none of the measures gives rise to any
doubt as to its scope, substance or other aspects;

WHEREAS, the direction (in Dutch: aanwijzing) qualifies as a decision (in
Dutch: besluit) within the meaning of section 1:3(1) of the Dutch General Administrative Law
Act (in Dutch: Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht);
WHEREAS, the use of the English language in this Order is appropriate in
accordance with Section 2:6 of the Netherlands General Administrative Law Act. By signing this
document, ABN AMRO recognizes that the use of the English language is appropriate. In
DNB’s opinion the interests of third parties are not harmed by not using the Dutch language
because the use of the English language is widely recognized as standard in similar matters;
WHEREAS, DNB must point out that every interested party (in Dutch:
belanghebbende) is entitled to file an objection (in Dutch: bezwaar) against the decision (in
Dutch: besluit) to issue a direction (in Dutch: aanwijzing) within the meaning of section 28 of the
Act on the Supervision of the Credit System by sending in a writ of objections (in Dutch:
bezwaarschrift) to DNB within six weeks after DNB having sent this decision to ABN AMRO.
This decision has been sent to ABN AMRO on December 19, 2005; and
WHEREAS, by signing this document ABN AMRO confirms that it has informed
DNB that it will not use its right to file an objection against this decision;
Laws of the United States
WHEREAS, the Board of Governors issues this Order pursuant to section 8(b) of
the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)); the IDFPR issues this Order pursuant to Section 18 of the
Foreign Banking Office Act, (205 ILCS 645/1 et seq.) and Section 48 (6)(b) of the Illinois
Banking Act, (205 ILCS 5/1 et seq.); and the NYSBD issues this Order pursuant to Section 39 of
the New York Banking Law;

WHEREAS, on December 19, 2005, the Managing Board of ABN AMRO
adopted a resolution:
A.

authorizing and directing Rijkman W.J. Groenink, Chairman of ABN AMRO, and

Joost Ch.L. Kuiper to enter into this Order, on behalf of ABN AMRO, the New York
Branch, and the Chicago Branch consenting to compliance by ABN AMRO, the New
York Branch, the Chicago Branch, and their institution-affiliated parties, as defined in
sections 3(u) and 8(b)(4) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(u) and 1818(b)(4)), with
each and every provision of this Order;
B.

waiving any and all rights that ABN AMRO, the New York Branch and the

Chicago Branch may have pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818 and 1847 or 12 C.F.R. Part
263, Section 25 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq.), or
otherwise:
(i)

to the issuance of a Notice of Charges and of Hearing on any matter set
forth in this Order;

(ii)

to a hearing for the purpose of taking evidence of any matters set forth in
this Order;

(iii)

to judicial review of this Order; and

(iv)

to challenge or contest, in any manner, the basis, issuance, validity, terms,
effectiveness or enforceability of this Order or any provision hereof;

NOW, THEREFORE, before the filing of any notices, or taking of any testimony or
adjudication of or finding on any issues of fact or law herein, and without this Order constituting
an admission or denial by ABN AMRO, the New York Branch, or the Chicago Branch of any

allegation made or implied by the Supervisors in connection with this matter, and solely for the
purpose of settling this matter without a formal proceeding being filed and without the necessity
for protracted or extended hearings or testimony and pursuant to the aforesaid resolution:
I.

ENHANCED U.S. LAW COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Supervisors that:
1.

Within 90 days of this Order, ABN AMRO shall submit to the Supervisors an
acceptable enhanced global regulatory compliance program (“U.S. Law
Compliance Program”) for all matters related to global compliance with the
applicable state and federal laws of the United States (“U.S. Laws”), in particular,
the laws and regulations set forth in this Order. The U.S. Law Compliance
Program may include elements from existing or already proposed compliance
systems.

Management and Governance
A. The management and governance structure of the U.S. Law Compliance
Program shall include, at a minimum:
i. Designation of a committee of ABN AMRO’s Supervisory Board (which
could be a new committee or the existing Supervisory Board Compliance
Oversight Committee)(“Supervisory Board Compliance Committee”) to
be responsible for overseeing the U.S. Law Compliance Program; this
committee shall ensure that periodic and other reports are provided to the
Supervisory Board, and shall review all significant compliance incidents.
The committee shall promptly receive information about significant
compliance-related incidents, including how these incidents are resolved,

and ensure that information about such incidents is included in its periodic
reports to the Supervisory Board;
ii. designation of a high ranking executive (“Chief Compliance Officer”) to
be responsible for the U.S. Law Compliance Program. The Chief
Compliance Officer shall not have responsibility for any business line, and
shall report to the Managing Board, as well as to the Supervisory Board
Compliance Committee, with respect to the U.S. Law Compliance
Program. The Chief Compliance Officer shall be given the authority and
the resources necessary to meet these responsibilities. All decisions
concerning the Chief Compliance Officer’s hiring, appraisal, promotion,
salary, and termination shall be approved by the Managing Board, with the
explicit consent of the Supervisory Board;
iii. a systematic description of the organizational arrangements and control
mechanisms of the U.S. Law Compliance Program, aimed at conducting
the activities in a controlled and sound manner, including interfaces with
non-U.S. offices and affiliates of ABN AMRO.
Integrated Compliance Activities
B. The U.S. Law Compliance Program shall include, at a minimum, the
following elements designed to ensure that ABN AMRO complies with U.S.
Laws, and to ensure that non-U.S. offices and affiliates do not engage in
practices aimed at evading or circumventing ABN AMRO’s compliance
programs and controls in the United States:

i. A detailed analysis of the U.S. law compliance risks arising from ABN
AMRO business conducted within or outside the United States;
ii. policies and procedures for obtaining and acting on, as appropriate, legal
or any other technical advice;
iii. policies and procedures for reporting, as required, to the Supervisors, or, if
relevant, another host country supervisor, or other government agency,
sufficient to ensure compliance with U.S. Laws with respect to any
business conducted by ABN AMRO that is governed in whole or in part
by such laws. To the extent that reporting is limited or prohibited by the
laws of the location where the activity takes place, the policies and
procedures shall require that ABN AMRO use its best efforts to report to
the Supervisors, another host country supervisor, or other government
agency;
iv. the establishment of a compliance reporting system widely publicized
within the organization and integrated into any other general reporting
systems provided for by ABN AMRO that employees use to report known
or suspected violations of law or bank policy concerning U.S. Laws,
including a process for resolving or escalating the reported violations or
apparent violations;
v. general guidelines that will specifically contain prescriptive criteria related
to (a) compliance with U.S. Laws addressing cross-border payment
processing procedures; and (b) due diligence concerning customers who
directly or indirectly utilize the dollar clearing and other services,

including advising or confirming with respect to letter of credit
transactions, of ABN AMRO in the United States;
vi. strategies for training employees in compliance issues appropriate to the
employee’s job responsibilities on an ongoing or periodic basis which will
cover specifically, whenever appropriate, compliance with U.S. Laws;
vii. new product and process approval procedures designed to ensure that
consideration is given to the applicability of U.S. laws and regulations,
and that an adequate control infrastructure is developed and implemented
to ensure compliance with any applicable U.S. laws and regulations;
viii. standards for employee performance appraisals (including compensation
reviews) that take into account the employee’s role in ensuring ABN
AMRO’s full compliance with U.S. Laws and the reporting of compliance
incidents when discovered or suspected; and
ix. standards for and implementation of ongoing compliance testing and risk
assessment procedures.
Global Compliance Audit and Ongoing Reviews
C. The U.S. Law Compliance Program shall also include, at a minimum:
i. An audit program that will require regular audits by internal auditors of
ABN AMRO to identify and propose the correction of any deficiencies
relating to U.S. Laws. The deficiencies may relate to violations of U.S.
Laws or to procedures designed to circumvent the compliance systems of
ABN AMRO’s U.S. operations;

ii. a requirement that all internal audits under the U.S. Law Compliance
Program be executed and delivered in accordance with industry standards,
and result in written reports that will contain a formal rating and opinion
on the effectiveness of internal controls and on compliance with applicable
U.S. laws and regulations;
iii. systems and procedures to monitor the status and evaluate the
effectiveness of corrective action taken to address weaknesses identified
by audit and compliance personnel, or by the Supervisors. Such
procedures shall include a mechanism to ensure that significant risk
weaknesses identified are periodically brought to the attention of the
Managing Board and the Supervisory Board Compliance Committee,
together with accompanying management comments (plans for corrective
action and timelines), as well as to be reported to the Audit Committee of
the Supervisory Board;
iv. on at least an annual basis, in conjunction with audit(s) of the U.S. Law
Compliance Program or otherwise, a review of ABN AMRO’s policies
and procedures and the implementation of changes that are appropriate to
ensure that the U.S. Law Compliance Program is functioning effectively to
minimize the incidence of compliance problems covered by this Order,
and to effectively detect, correct, and report such problems when they
occur; and
v. a regimen for the periodic and ongoing assessment by business areas of
the effectiveness of U.S. Law Compliance Program implemented pursuant

to Part I of this Order, and reports to the Chief Compliance Officer of the
results of such self assessments together with plans for addressing issues
uncovered in such reviews, and oversight by the Supervisory Board
Compliance Committee, which shall focus on the implementation and
effectiveness of the plans proposed and implemented by business areas.
II.

HEAD OFFICE OVERSIGHT
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the Supervisors that:
2.

Within 60 days of this Order, ABN AMRO shall submit to the Supervisors an
acceptable written plan to strengthen oversight of the management of the
Branches within the structure of ABN AMRO’s global operations. The plan shall,
at a minimum, set forth:
A. The actions that ABN AMRO’s head office management and U.S.
management will take to improve its oversight of the Branches and maintain
effective control over and supervision of the Branches’ senior management,
operations, and activities, including obtaining information sufficient to assess
management’s adherence with applicable written plans, policies, procedures,
and programs;
B. the responsibility of ABN AMRO’s head office management and U.S.
management to ensure that the Branches’ policies and procedures are tailored
to its operations, and adequately address its activities;
C. the responsibility of ABN AMRO’s head office management to ensure that
the Branches’ operations are conducted in a safe and sound manner by
enforcing adherence to the Branches’ anti-money laundering policies and

procedures, particularly those relating to its compliance function, and by
overseeing activities of the Branches; and
D. the responsibility of ABN AMRO’s head office management to monitor
exceptions to approved policies and procedures.
III.

THE BRANCHES’ ACTIVITIES AND OVERSIGHT
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the U.S. Supervisors that:
Continued Compliance with Existing Written Agreement
3. ABN AMRO and the New York Branch shall continue to implement the programs
and plans required by the July 2004 Written Agreement that were submitted to the
Reserve Banks, the NYSBD and the IDFPR with respect to Anti-Money Laundering
Compliance (Paragraph 1), Independent Testing and Audit (Paragraph 2), Training
(Paragraph 3), and Suspicious Activity Reporting and Customer Due Diligence
(Paragraph 4) of the Written Agreement, as required by Paragraph 6 of the Written
Agreement. In addition, ABN AMRO and the New York Branch shall fully
implement additional recommendations and address the criticisms noted in the
Examination Letter from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the New York
State Banking Department to ABN AMRO, dated October 3, 2005, particularly those
relating to ABN AMRO’s customer due diligence program and transaction
monitoring programs. If the Board of Governors, the NYSBD or the IDFPR request
changes to those programs, ABN AMRO and the New York Branch shall submit an
acceptable plan to implement those changes within 60 days of notification.
4. ABN AMRO and the New York Branch shall continue to submit reports as required
by Paragraph 7 of the Written Agreement.

5. Except as incorporated by reference in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Order, upon the
effective date of this Order, the Written Agreement is terminated and the terms of this
Order are substituted in its place.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the Supervisors that:
Management Plan
6. Within 60 days of this Order, ABN AMRO shall submit to the Supervisors a written
plan to improve the effectiveness of the management structure of the Branches. The
primary purpose of the management plan shall be to aid in the development of an
effective management oversight structure and control environment for both business
and compliance purposes. The management plan shall, at a minimum, include:
A. An assessment of the effectiveness of the control infrastructure, corporate
governance and organizational structure of the Branches within the structure
of ABN AMRO’s U.S. operations, including management supervision,
internal controls, reporting lines, duties performed by each officer and
employee, and compliance with applicable federal and state laws and
regulations consistent with the U.S. Law Compliance Program set forth in Part
I of this Order;
B. an organization chart, reflecting both direct and indirect reporting lines,
detailing the management structure for the ABN AMRO organization in the
United States, including the Branches, that sets forth:
i. the reporting lines within each of the Branches;
ii. reporting lines to each of the Branches from other ABN AMRO offices or
officials;

iii. reporting lines from the Branches to other ABN AMRO offices or
officials; and
iv. the names and qualifications of the individuals in charge of each business
line or control function in each of the Branches;
C. the development and adoption of escalation procedures relating to activities of
the Branches designed to ensure that material issues are reported to
appropriate committees and senior management of ABN AMRO outside of
the respective business lines, and that appropriate corrective action is taken;
and
D. the development of processes designed to ensure that any strategic or business
line includes full due diligence and a sound strategic implementation plan that
incorporates appropriate oversight, controls, compliance, and risk
monitoring/reporting.
Internal Audit
7.

ABN AMRO and the Branches shall continue to develop and improve the internal
audit programs for the Branches. Within 60 days of the Order, ABN AMRO and
the Branches shall jointly submit to the Supervisors acceptable enhanced written
internal audit policies and procedures that shall, at a minimum, address, consider,
and include:
A. Procedures to evaluate the Branches’ compliance with applicable laws and
regulations for each audit area consistent with the U.S. Law Compliance
Program set forth in Part I of this Order;

B. policies and procedures for an ongoing program to provide quality assurance
evaluations of the internal audit program;
C. procedures for the periodic submission directly to ABN AMRO’s audit
committee of all high risk audit issues or deficiencies, regardless of the format
in which the issue or deficiency is documented;
D. procedures designed to ensure that Supervisors are given access to internal
audit work products, including, but not limited to, all interim reports and final
reports. For this purpose, interim reports include, at a minimum, any report
that has been completed by Internal Audit for submission to management,
regardless of whether subsequent reports are modified based on comments
from management; and
E. procedures for the establishment of a process to monitor the status and
designed to ensure effective follow-up of corrective action taken to address
weaknesses identified by audit and compliance personnel, or the Supervisors,
and establish procedures to conduct targeted audits to evaluate remedial
action.
OFAC Compliance
8.

Within 60 days of this Order, ABN AMRO shall submit to the Supervisors an
acceptable written plan, consistent with the U.S. Law Compliance Program set
forth in Part I of this Order, that includes:
A. Procedures designed to ensure that issues relating to compliance with OFAC
regulations (31 C.F.R. Chapter V), or any guidelines issued or administered
by OFAC, that arise in connection with operations of the Branches or other

U.S. offices of ABN AMRO, or that otherwise come to the attention of
personnel of the Branches or other offices of ABN AMRO, are escalated to
the appropriate compliance personnel;
B. procedures designed to ensure that any violations or apparent violations of
regulations issued by OFAC are promptly reported and addressed;
C. the designation of a compliance official who has appropriate expertise in
OFAC compliance for the Branches;
D. procedures designed to ensure that the compliance program of the Branches is
adequately staffed and funded with respect to OFAC compliance; and
E. strategies for training of both U.S. and non-U.S. employees in OFAC issues
appropriate to the employee’s job responsibilities on an ongoing basis,
especially with regard to cross border United States dollar payment processing
procedures.
9.

ABN AMRO shall continue to cooperate in providing information responding to
any ongoing OFAC inquiries on the effective date of this Order, consistent with
the cooperation it has provided to date in those inquiries.

MISCELLANEOUS
10.

The program, plans, and policies and procedures required by Paragraphs 1, 2, and
7-8 of this Order shall be submitted to the Supervisors for review and approval.
Programs, plans, and policies and procedures required by Paragraphs 1, 2, and 6-8
shall be submitted within the time periods set forth in this Order. ABN AMRO
and the Branches shall adopt the approved programs, plans and policies and
procedures within 10 days of approval by the Supervisors unless otherwise set

forth in a schedule of implementation included in the acceptable program, plan, or
policies and procedures. During the term of this Order, the approved programs,
plans and policies and procedures shall not be amended or rescinded without the
prior written approval of the Supervisors, or U.S. Supervisors, as applicable.
11.

Within 20 days of the end of each month following the date of this Order, ABN
AMRO and the Branches shall jointly submit to the Supervisors written progress
reports detailing the form and manner of all actions taken to secure compliance
with the provisions of this Order, and the results thereof. The Supervisors may, in
writing, discontinue the requirement for progress reports or modify the reporting
schedule.

12.

The provisions of this Order shall not bar, estop or otherwise prevent any of DNB,
or any agency or department of The Netherlands, the Board of Governors, IDFPR,
and the NYSBD or any other U.S. federal or state agency or department from
taking any other action affecting ABN AMRO or any of its current or former
subsidiaries, or affiliates.

13.

Each provision of this Order shall remain effective and enforceable according to
the laws of The Netherlands, the United States of America, and the States of
Illinois and New York, until stayed, modified, terminated or suspended by DNB,
the Board of Governors, the IDFPR, and the NYSBD, as applicable. ABN
AMRO may apply to DNB, the Board of Governors, the IDFPR and the NYSBD
to have this Order terminated, modified or amended.

14.

No amendment to the provisions of this Order shall be effective unless made in
writing by DNB, the Board of Governors, the IDFPR and the NYSBD, as
applicable, and by ABN AMRO.

15.

The provisions of this Order shall be binding on ABN AMRO, its institutionaffiliated parties, as defined by 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(u) and 1818(b)(4) of the FDI
Act, and ABN AMRO’s successors and assigns.

16.

No representations, either oral or written, except those provisions as set forth
herein, were made to induce any of the parties to agree to the provisions as set
forth herein.

17.

Notwithstanding any provision of this Order, DNB, the Board of Governors, the
IDFPR and the NYSBD may, in their discretion, grant written extensions of time
to ABN AMRO to comply with any provision of this Order.

18.

The Board of Governors delegates to the Reserve Banks the authority to approve
the programs, plans or policies and procedures submitted pursuant to Paragraph
10, above.

19.

All communications regarding this Order shall be addressed to:
(a)

Mr. Arnold Schilder
Executive Director
De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.
Westeinde 1
1017 ZN Amsterdam
The Netherlands

(b)

Scott G. Alvarez, Esq.
General Counsel
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
20th & C Streets, NW
Washington, DC 20551

(c)

Mr. Robert A. O’Sullivan
Senior Vice President
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045

(d)

Ms. Catharine Lemieux, Ph. D.
Senior Vice President
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
230 North LaSalle St.
Chicago, IL 60604

(e)

Mr. Scott D. Clarke
Assistant Director
IDFPR, Division of Banking
500 East Monroe Street
Springfield, Illinois 62701

(f)

Mr. Michael J. Lesser
Deputy Superintendent
New York State Banking Department
One State Street
New York, NY 10004

(g)

ABN AMRO Bank N.V.
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. - - New York Branch
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. - - Chicago Branch
Carin Gorter
Group Compliance
Gustav Mahlerlaan 10, Amsterdam
P.O. Box 283 (HQ 9156)
1000 EA Amsterdam
The Netherlands

By order of De Nederiandsche Bank (with respect to all Paragraphs except
Paragraphs 3-5), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Illinois Department
of Financial and Professional Regulation and the New York State Banking Department, effective
this 19th day of December 2005.

ABN AMRO BANK N.V.

By: (signed)
Rijkman W.J. Groenink
Chairman of the Managing Board
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SUPERVISION AND REGULATION

SR 97-19 (SUP)
June 30, 1997
TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SUPERVISION
AT EACH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
SUBJECT: Private Banking Activities

Private banking activities, which involve, among other things, personalized
services such as money management, financial advice, and investment services for high net
worth clients, have become an increasingly important aspect of the operations of some large,
internationally active banking organizations. The Federal Reserve has traditionally reviewed
private banking activities in connection with regular on-site examinations. In 1996 and 1997,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York undertook a comprehensive review of private
banking activities at approximately 40 domestic and foreign banking organizations in the
Second District in order to enhance the Federal Reserve's understanding about private
banking operations. Examiners focused principally on assessing each institution's ability to
recognize and manage the potential reputational and legal risks that may be associated with
inadequate knowledge and understanding of its clients' personal and business backgrounds,
sources of wealth, and uses of private banking accounts. In carrying out the reviews,
examiners considered the parameters of an appropriate control infrastructure that is suited to
support the effective management of these risks.
The reviews indicated that there are certain essential elements associated with
sound private banking activities, and these elements are described in a paper, prepared by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, entitled "Guidance on Sound Risk Management
Practices Governing Private Banking Activities". A copy of the sound practices paper is
attached for the use of your examiners, and we are requesting that you provide copies to each
domestic and foreign banking organization in your District that conducts private banking
activities. A suggested transmittal letter is also attached.
The sound practices paper provides banking organizations with guidance
regarding the basic controls necessary to minimize reputational and legal risk and to deter
illicit activities, such as money laundering. The essential elements associated with sound
private banking activities are, in brief outline, as follows:
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•

Management Oversight. Senior management's active oversight of private banking
activities and the creation of an appropriate corporate culture are crucial elements of a
sound risk management and control environment. Goals and objectives must be set at
high levels, and senior management must be proactive in overseeing compliance with
corporate policies and procedures.
• Policies and Procedures. All well run private banking operations have written "Know
Your Customer" policies and procedures, consistent with guidance provided by the
Federal Reserve over the past several years, that require banking organizations to
obtain identification and basic background information on their clients, describe the
clients' source of wealth and lines of business, request references, handle referrals,
and identify red flags and suspicious transactions. They also have adequate written
credit policies and procedures that address, among other things, money launderingrelated issues, such as lending secured by cash collateral.
• Risk Management Practices and Monitoring Systems. Sound private banking
operations stress the importance of the acquisition and retention of documentation
relating to their clients, as well as due diligence regarding obtaining follow-up
information where needed to verify or corroborate information provided by a
customer or his or her representative. Inherent in sound private banking operations is
the retention of beneficial owner information in the United States for accounts opened
by financial advisors or through the use of off-shore facilities. Adequate management
information systems capable of, among other things, monitoring all aspects of an
organization's private banking activities are also stressed. These include systems that
provide management with timely information necessary to analyze and effectively
manage the private banking business and systems that enable management to monitor
accounts for suspicious transactions and to report any such instances to law
enforcement authorities and banking regulators as required by the regulators'
suspicious activity reporting regulations.
• Segregation of Duties, Compliance, and Audit. Because private banking activities are
generally conducted through relationship managers, banking organizations need to
have an effective system of oversight by senior officials and by board committees, as
well as guidelines pertaining to the segregation of duties to prevent the unauthorized
waiver of documentation requirements, poorly documented referrals, and overlooked
suspicious activities. Likewise, strong compliance and internal audit programs are
essential to ensure the integrity of the risk management and internal control
environment established by senior management and the board of directors.
Other Related Projects and Products
The lessons learned from the private banking reviews will be incorporated
into a new examination manual for private banking activities. The manual will be in two
parts: one which describes the examination procedures for a comprehensive, top to bottom
review of a private banking operation; and the other, a set of "risk focused" guidelines aimed
at assisting examiners in determining which procedures should be followed depending, for
example, on the level of private banking activity, any noted deficiencies, management's
responsiveness in implementing corrective action, and the sufficiency of the organization's
internal audit program. We expect to start field testing these new procedures within the next
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three months.
In the next few weeks, the Federal Reserve will also distribute an updated
Bank Secrecy Act examination manual. The updated version will include examination
procedures relating to recent additions and changes to the Bank Secrecy Act, as well as
updated sections related to anti-money laundering initiatives.
Staff is in the process of developing a draft regulation that would require
banking organizations to establish "Know Your Customer" policies and procedures. The
results of the private banking reviews will be incorporated into the proposed regulation. In
moving forward with this initiative, the Federal Reserve will coordinate its efforts with the
other federal banking agencies regarding the breadth and scope of the rules in order to ensure
that all banking organizations in the United States operate under the same standards.
In the event you have any questions regarding the attached sound practices
paper, please contact Ms. Nancy Bercovici, Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, at (212) 720-8227, or Mr. Richard A. Small, Special Counsel, Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation, at (202) 452-5235. Other questions can be directed to
Mr. Small.

Richard Spillenkothen
Director

Attachments

Suggested Transmittal Letter
to the Chief Executive Officer or General Manager of
Each State Member Bank, Bank Holding Company, and
U.S. Branch and Agency of a Foreign Bank
That Conducts Private Banking Activities
Subject: "Sound Practices" For Private Banking Activities
Dear ______________________:
Private banking activities, which involve, among other things, personalized
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services such as money management, financial advice, and investment services for high net
worth clients, have become an increasingly important aspect of the operations of some large,
internationally active banking organizations. The Federal Reserve has traditionally reviewed
private banking activities in connection with regular on-site examinations. In 1996 and 1997,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York undertook a comprehensive review of private
banking activities at approximately 40 domestic and foreign banking organizations in the
Second District in order to enhance the Federal Reserve's understanding about private
banking operations. Examiners focused principally on assessing each institution's ability to
recognize and manage the potential reputational and legal risks that may be associated with
inadequate knowledge and understanding of its clients' personal and business backgrounds,
sources of wealth, and uses of private banking accounts. In carrying out the reviews,
examiners considered the parameters of an appropriate control infrastructure that is suited to
support the effective management of these risks.
The reviews indicated that there are certain essential elements associated with
sound private banking activities, and these elements are described in a paper, prepared by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, entitled "Guidance on Sound Risk Management
Practices Governing Private Banking Activities". A copy of the sound practices paper is
attached for your information.
The sound practices paper provides you with guidance regarding the basic
controls necessary to minimize reputational and legal risk and to deter illicit activities, such
as money laundering. The essential elements associated with sound private banking
activities are, in brief outline, as follows:
•

Management Oversight. Senior management's active oversight of private banking
activities and the creation of an appropriate corporate culture are crucial elements of a
sound risk management and control environment. Goals and objectives must be set at
high levels, and senior management must be proactive in overseeing compliance with
corporate policies and procedures.
• Policies and Procedures. All well run private banking operations have written "Know
Your Customer" policies and procedures, consistent with guidance provided by the
Federal Reserve over the past several years, that require banking organizations to
obtain identification and basic background information on their clients, describe the
clients' source of wealth and lines of business, request references, handle referrals,
and identify red flags and suspicious transactions. They also have adequate written
credit policies and procedures that address, among other things, money launderingrelated issues, such as lending secured by cash collateral.
• Risk Management Practices and Monitoring Systems. Sound private banking
operations stress the importance of the acquisition and retention of documentation
relating to their clients, as well as due diligence regarding obtaining follow-up
information where needed to verify or corroborate information provided by a
customer or his or her representative. Inherent in sound private banking operations is
the retention of beneficial owner information in the United States for accounts opened
by financial advisors or through the use of off-shore facilities. Adequate management
information systems capable of, among other things, monitoring all aspects of an
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organization's private banking activities are also stressed. These include systems that
provide management with timely information necessary to analyze and effectively
manage the private banking business and systems that enable management to monitor
accounts for suspicious transactions and to report any such instances to law
enforcement authorities and banking regulators as required by the regulators'
suspicious activity reporting regulations.
• Segregation of Duties, Compliance, and Audit. Because private banking activities are
generally conducted through relationship managers, banking organizations need to
have an effective system of oversight by senior officials and by board committees, as
well as guidelines pertaining to the segregation of duties to prevent the unauthorized
waiver of documentation requirements, poorly documented referrals, and overlooked
suspicious activities. Likewise, strong compliance and internal audit programs are
essential to ensure the integrity of the risk management and internal control
environment established by senior management and the board of directors.
In the event you have any questions regarding the attached sound practices
paper, please contact Ms. Nancy Bercovici, Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, at (212) 720-8227, or Mr. Richard A. Small, Special Counsel, Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at
(202) 452-5235.

Sincerely,

Enclosure
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Guidance on Sound Risk Management Practices
Governing Private Banking Activities
Prepared by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
July 1997

Guidance on Sound Risk Management Practices Governing Private Banking Activities
This paper presents the observations of examiners of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York regarding sound risk management and internal control practices with respect to
private banking activities. Findings are based on a year-long cycle of on-site examinations of
the risk management practices of approximately forty institutions in the Second Federal
Reserve District that are engaged in the provision of financial services to high net worth
individuals, which is commonly referred to as private banking. These examinations
represented a cross section of commercial banks, Edge Act corporations, trust companies,
and U.S. branches of foreign banks. Our examiners found varying degrees of sophistication
and depth in private banking activities. And, we recognize that what constitutes sound
practice may vary according to the particulars of each organization's business.
The guidance presented in this paper is not a regulation and should not be
interpreted as such. The sound practices reflect the type of information banks need to have to
satisfy existing legal requirements as well as transactions testing performed by examiners,
and the types of controls essential to minimize reputational and legal risk and deter money
laundering. The goal of the paper is to ensure that banks are aware of the major issues
currently under review by regulatory and legal authorities and to further the dialogue with
institutions engaged in private banking.
Heightened supervisory interest in private banking activities primarily reflects
market developments. Recently, domestic and foreign banking organizations have been
increasing their private banking activities and their reliance on income from this business
line. Several large institutions reported plans to increase sharply the net contribution of
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private banking to their organizations' earnings. Additionally, the target market for private
banking -- high net worth individuals -- is growing and becoming more sophisticated and
diverse with regard to product and service preferences and risk appetites. As the target
market for private banking is growing, so is the level of competition among institutions that
provide private banking services. Banking organizations are experiencing competition for
private banking clients from non-bank financial institutions, including securities dealers, and
asset management and brokerage firms. Accordingly, there are increased pressures on the
relationship managers and marketing officers of banking organizations to obtain new clients,
increase their assets under management, and contribute a greater percentage to the net
income of their organizations.
The reviews underlying this paper focused primarily on assessing each banking
institution's ability to recognize and manage the potential reputational and legal risks that
may be associated with inadequate knowledge and understanding of the clients' personal and
business background, source of wealth and use of their private banking accounts. Also
considered were the essential characteristics of an appropriate control infrastructure that is
suited to support the effective management of these risks.
To varying degrees, the sound practices identified here either are currently in
place or are in the process of being implemented in most institutions, although it is
recognized that practices observed in the United States may differ from global practices. The
discussion is structured as follows: (I) management oversight, (II) policies and procedures,
(III) risk management practices and monitoring systems, and (IV) segregation of duties,
compliance and audit.
I

Management Oversight of Private Banking

Senior management's active oversight of private banking activities and the
creation of an appropriate corporate culture are crucial elements of a sound risk management
and control environment. Senior management is responsible for identifying clearly the
purpose and objectives of the organization's private banking activities. A statement that
describes the target client base, the range of services offered to clients, and the financial
objectives and risk tolerances should be approved by senior management and establish
accountability for risk management and control functions. Well-developed goals and
objectives not only describe the target client base in terms of factors such as minimum net
worth, investable assets and the types of products and services sought, but specifically
indicate the types of clients the institution will and will not accept, and establish multiple and
segregated levels of authorization for new client acceptance. Institutions that follow such
sound practices will be better positioned to design and deliver products and services that
match their clients' needs, while reducing the likelihood that unsuitable clients will be
accepted.
Senior management should be actively involved in strategic planning for the
private banking operation. Sound strategic planning should involve not only setting targets
such as revenue, assets under management, and the number of new accounts, but also include
the establishment of control and risk management goals, such as satisfactory audit and
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compliance reviews. The most control-conscious institutions have passed these and other
specific qualitative goals through to relationship managers. In some cases, they have
included these factors in employee compensation schemes, thus promoting accountability
and responsibility for risk management and control processes.
The culture that exists within the private banking operation invariably reflects
senior management's level of commitment to controls and risk management. A focused,
integrated, "top-down" approach to embracing risk management and control concepts will
most effectively foster an environment in which managers and staff are knowledgeable and
aware of the risks in their portfolio. This approach to private banking activities will help
ensure that staff members apply consistent practices, communicate effectively, and assume
responsibility and accountability for controls.
Each organization should ensure that its policies and procedures for conducting
private banking activities are evaluated and updated regularly, and that there is a clear
delineation of roles, responsibilities and accountability for implementing such policies and
procedures.
II Policies and Procedures
As a private banking operation frequently functions as a "bank within a bank,"
there are different policies and procedures needed to govern its activities and operations.
This paper focuses primarily on the significance of sound Know Your Customer ("KYC")
policies and procedures in managing the reputational and legal risks inherent in private
banking activities.
Know Your Customer Policies and Procedures
Nearly all of the institutions examined had written KYC policies and procedures
-- most of which captured the spirit of sound KYC guidelines. These institutions have taken
a reasonable approach to including essential components of a sound KYC policy in their
written policies, such as: obtaining identification and basic background information on the
clients, describing the clients' source of wealth and line of business, requesting references,
handling referrals and identifying red-flags or suspicious transactions. Policies also should
require that the clients' source of wealth and funds be corroborated and include specific
guidelines on how to corroborate information provided by the client. Sound policies also
define acceptable KYC information for different types of account holders, such as
individuals, operating companies, personal investment companies ("PICs"), trusts, clients of
financial advisers or other intermediaries, and financial advisers. These policies also should
recognize that contact/visitation reports written by private bankers, which document their
meetings with clients in their home countries and places of business, are an important
component to the KYC process.
Additionally, sound policies require that the type and volume of transactions
expected to be passing through the clients' accounts be documented, with actual flows
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monitored to assist in detecting suspicious or unusual transactions. Accountability for
following up on suspicious activities and making such reports as may be required should also
be clearly assigned.
Compliance with policies should be expected by senior management as a matter
of course; waivers should be the exception, not the rule, and reasons for any exception should
be documented. Moreover, all waivers should be handled by authorized personnel -- thus
reinforcing senior management's oversight of the risk management process. Clearly, the best
written policies and procedures will not work unless they are implemented effectively and
modified appropriately to reflect changing industry practices.
Credit Policies and Procedures
Lending to high net worth individuals and their business concerns often takes on
unique banking characteristics. The majority of private banking lending is fully secured -often by cash, securities and other assets held by the private banking function. Thus, the
extensions of credit to high net worth individuals on a secured basis should not result in
compromising sound underwriting standards. If credit is extended based on collateral, even
if the collateral is cash, repayment is not assured. For example, collateral derived from illicit
activities may be subject to government forfeiture. Accordingly, when extending secured
private banking loans, institutions should be satisfied as to the source and legitimacy of the
client's collateral, the borrower's intended use of the proceeds and the source of repayment.
Some institutions have appropriately recognized that, when lending to high net worth
individuals, whether on a secured or unsecured basis, the creditworthiness determination is
bolstered by a thorough and well-structured KYC process.
III Risk Management Practices and Monitoring Systems
Effective risk management practices and systems that carry out the KYC policies
are the foundation of a sound risk management process. These practices should be wellintegrated within the organization and reassessed on an ongoing basis. Additionally, relevant
personnel should recognize their roles in the process, as well as their accountability.
Documentation and Due Diligence
Virtually all institutions perform more due diligence on relationships established
currently than on accounts that were opened in the past. They are supplementing basic
account- opening information, such as identification through passports and national identity
cards and other basic personal and business data, including the client's mailing address,
profession, and estimated net worth, with more detailed and substantive information. Sound
practice requires institutions to obtain references on their clients from reliable, independent
sources, such as other financial institutions, the client's business associates, attorneys or
accountants. Independent references that describe the capacity in which the referring party
knew the client and the nature of their relationship are important components of the KYC
process, and institutions routinely should seek to obtain these references. Furthermore, if
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internal references from personnel that serve the client from an affiliated office are used,
such references should be accompanied by detailed, well-supported documentation.
Institutions employ a wide array of sound practices to corroborate a client's
source of wealth and business activities, in addition to obtaining references. For example,
some institutions have obtained private credit agency reports on their clients' businesses,
including those in foreign countries. Private bankers have also sought out public information
on high profile clients in the press, periodicals and through standard database searches.
Sound practice also suggests that private bankers obtain financial statements, marketing
brochures, and annual reports of clients' businesses as additional corroboration sources.1
Examinations have confirmed that there are relatively easy and unobtrusive ways to
corroborate a private banking client's source of wealth, whether that client is from the United
States or abroad.
A concerted effort should be made to embrace these due diligence practices with
prospective and existing private banking clients to assure that a client's source of funds is
legitimate. While most institutions emphasized the significance of documentation and due
diligence during the client acceptance process, it is equally important to ensure that client
profiles are appropriately updated throughout the relationship with the client.
Most banking institutions maintain and manage accounts for PICs in their U.S.
offices; in fact, frequently PICs are established for the client -- the beneficial owner of the
PIC -- by one of the institution's affiliated trust companies in an offshore secrecy
jurisdiction. The majority of these institutions employ the sound practice of applying the
same general KYC standards to PICs as they do to personal private banking accounts -- they
identify and profile the beneficial owners. Most institutions had KYC documentation on the
beneficial owners of the PICs in their U.S. files.
The beneficial owners of PICs have a legitimate right to protect their financial
privacy, and some high net worth private clients may have a special and legitimate need for
confidentiality -- because of their public prominence, for example. The needed
confidentiality in these cases may be afforded by promulgating special protections as to
access to the records revealing the identity of a beneficial owner of a PIC. However, the
ability to make proper identification of the beneficial owner remains an important control
within the banking organization. First, without this control, the banking organization cannot
satisfy its compliance obligations with respect to legal process served on the banking
organization, which might reach property owned or controlled by a particular beneficial
owner, including the PIC itself. If the banking organization has structured its records in a
way that makes it impossible to comply with such process, this could cause the organization
serious compliance problems. Second, the lack of transparency may be an impediment to the
banking organization's understanding of its overall relationship with a particular beneficial
owner; and the existence of accounts for one or more PICs could confuse the organization
about the nature and depth of the overall relationship if the identity of the beneficial owner is
masked within management information systems. Finally, there is no legal impediment to
maintaining appropriate records. The law in the foreign jurisdiction where the PIC is
organized ordinarily should present no obstacle to recording the beneficial owner in a record
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that the banking organization maintains with respect to a PIC account in the United States.
KYC standards for the beneficial owners of PICs (and similarly for those of
offshore trusts and foundations) should be no different from those of other personal private
banking accounts. Further, institutions maintaining such accounts in the United States should
be able to make available, within a reasonable period of time, the identities and full KYC
profiles of the beneficial owners when requested by supervisors performing test-checks of
their KYC programs.2
Use of "Omnibus" and "Concentration" Accounts
Sound practice calls for each private banking client to have its own account(s) at
the bank, through which all of the client's transactions are directed. Private banking
operations should have the policies and controls in place to confirm that a client's funds flow
into and out of the client's account(s), and not through any other account, such as the
organization's suspense, omnibus or concentration accounts. Generally, it is inadvisable
from a risk management and control perspective for institutions to allow their clients to direct
transactions through the organization's suspense account(s). Such practices effectively
prevent association of the clients' names and account numbers with specific account activity,
could easily mask unusual transactions and flows, the monitoring of which is essential to
sound risk management in private banking, and could easily be abused.
Management Information Systems
The management information systems ("MIS") associated with private banking
activities were reviewed with a focus on the utility, thoroughness, timeliness and accuracy of
data reported to management and responsible individuals. While the size and complexity of
the private banking operation at each organization will affect the resources devoted to MIS,
private banking operations should make effective use of current technology to support their
risk management framework. The level of MIS support given to private banking frequently
was weaker than the support given to other areas of the same banking organization. In such
cases, institutions should develop specific plans to change or upgrade their MIS.
MIS should be migrating towards providing management with timely
information necessary to analyze and manage effectively the private banking business. The
types of reports that may meet this objective are those that reflect each client's holdings,
including those held through PICs and any affiliated accounts; any missing account opening
documentation; transactions made through a client's accounts that are unusual; and the
private banking function's profitability. Institutions that manage private banking activities on
a decentralized, functional basis may face challenges in uneven implementation of policies
and procedures and in aggregating a client's total relationship with the institution, as the
client's account balances might be recorded on disparate systems. Institutions with integrated
management of private banking activities have more success in capturing and reporting a
client's complete relationship. Management's ability to measure and analyze each client's
complete relationship with the organization is a key element for sound risk management, and
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MIS should support that objective.
MIS should be capable of monitoring accounts for unusual and potentially
suspicious activities. Many institutions are developing or enhancing systems which will
identify transactions that warrant explanation and evaluation because of their size, volume,
pattern, source or destination. Systems that identify individual transactions on an exception
basis, for example those that are above established thresholds in dollar amount and volume,
are more appropriate in the detection of aberrations in transactional behavior than systems
that only recognize net balance changes. There is a wide array of thresholds used to initiate
exception reports -- some institutions use a dollar minimum for each transaction, regardless
of the type of client or activity, while others segregate their client base and establish different
dollar/volume thresholds for transactions pertaining to each client grouping or to each
individual client account. Each institution should implement exception reporting that makes
sense and provides appropriate information within the context of its particular business. It
should recognize that the systems and reports are valuable only if there are individuals who
are responsible for receiving, analyzing and acting on the information generated.
Reporting Suspicious Activity
Procedures established to investigate and, if necessary, report suspicious private
banking activity also were reviewed. If legal, reputational, and other risks are to be
controlled, there must be a heightened focus on preventing and detecting money laundering
and other unlawful activity. Financial institutions clearly have a key responsibility in that
process. The Federal Reserve's Suspicious Activity Reporting regulations, which became
effective April 1, 1996, and are similar to regulations issued by the OCC, FDIC, OTS,
NCUA and the Treasury, impose a duty to file a Suspicious Activity Report ("SAR") for any
transaction that:
"has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular
customer would normally be expected to engage, and the institution knows of no reasonable
explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts including the background
and possible purpose of the transaction."
Some institutions with global private banking activities have recognized the
advantages in applying their suspicious activity monitoring procedures globally, as they will
be better equipped to detect and analyze patterns and trends of suspicious transactions within
their organizations. Private banking senior management should ensure that sound practices
are being followed throughout their organization. Management should ensure there is a
proactive approach and well-established procedures covering the SAR process and that
accountability exists within their organization for the analysis and follow-up of internally
identified suspicious activity, for the decision-making process as to whether or not to file a
SAR, and for maintaining or closing an account. Because there is a legal requirement to
report suspicious transactions, it is essential for banking organizations to maintain internal
programs that ensure compliance.
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IV Segregation of Duties, Compliance and Audit
Ensuring effective implementation of established policies and procedures is a
significant challenge to many private banking operations. Institutions that evidence ongoing
progress towards conformity with stated policies and procedures are those that recognize the
importance of segregation of duties and provide adequate attention, direction and support to
the individuals responsible for compliance and internal audit.
Segregation of Duties
Adequate segregation of duties in the KYC process is of critical importance.
Institutions should not rely exclusively on any individual relationship manager or immediate
supervisor to, for example, waive documentation required to open an account, approve the
client profile, authorize a new client relationship, fully identify (or "know") the client, and
monitor client accounts for unusual transactions. The more control-conscious institutions
ensure that an independent unit -- such as compliance, risk management or senior
management -- also has responsibility for these functions. Some institutions have segregated
KYC duties in a KYC committee comprised of relationship managers, compliance, and
senior management to determine, prior to the acceptance of any new client, if the potential
client's profile meets the institution's KYC standards. Many institutions have also introduced
the concept of "back-up relationship managers" or "client teams" to minimize the risk of a
single relationship manager having exclusive knowledge and control over individual
relationships.
Segregation of duties clearly facilitates the private banking operation's
compliance with policies and procedures and, consequently, minimizes reputational and legal
risk. Institutions that have not already established independent control over the abovementioned activities are urged to introduce such measures as soon as possible.
Compliance
Compliance functions are most effective if they are proactive in ensuring the
integrity of the control infrastructure of the private banking operation, as opposed to being
reactive to specific, isolated events. They should ensure that policies and procedures are
being followed by conducting frequent ad hoc reviews and tests that measure how different
groups within the private banking function are complying with the policies and procedures.
Some institutions assign to compliance the responsibility for reviewing all prospective client
profiles to determine if the relationship managers have satisfied the institutions' profiling
requirements, obtained necessary documentation and taken appropriate action where
problems arise. Compliance functions should also be in a position to recognize promptly any
client activity that may be unusual, to question relationship managers about the nature of
potentially suspicious activities, and to follow through on their inquiries and suspicions.
Compliance functions work effectively only when they have senior management
commitment and sufficient resources to accomplish their mission.
In creating a culture that follows best practices of risk management and internal
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control, institutions should conduct frequent training of personnel that is reinforced at regular
intervals, particularly in providing the "how to" of client profiling, conducting due diligence,
preparing customer call reports and detecting and responding to unusual activities. In some
cases, KYC training has been incorporated into the overall marketing and sales training
programs. This serves to integrate the concepts of knowing the client's personal and business
background, and source and legitimacy of wealth with those relating to the selling of
appropriate products and services that meet the client's needs and interests. The majority of
institutions provide training on money laundering and documentation requirements for their
compliance staff. Institutions also should incorporate this training into programs conducted
for their relationship managers.
Internal Audit
Comprehensive private banking audit programs are based on risk ratings that
apply an appropriate weighting to the major risks of the business, such as reputational and
legal risk, and audits that are conducted with sufficient frequency and involve adequate
transaction testing to determine the effectiveness of the internal control environment. KYC
testing, for example should be a critical element.
As internal audit plays a crucial role in independently evaluating the risk
management and controls, management should ensure that audit functions are staffed
adequately with individuals who are well-versed in private banking. In addition, auditors
should be proactive in following-up on their findings and criticisms.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to provide sound practice guidance to institutions
that are engaged in private banking, while at the same time contribute to the ongoing national
and international discussion of the difficult challenges of implementing effective Know Your
Customer policies and procedures. Banks face a major responsibility with their affirmative
legal obligation to prevent money laundering. This is particularly true in light of the general
expectation that private banking will grow significantly in size, complexity and diversity
over the next several years, with the result that business practices, policies and procedures
will need to be reviewed and revised to ensure effective risk management. We look forward
to continuing our dialogue with banks engaged in private banking.

Footnotes
1. Note that dealings with certain types of entities -- pension funds or public entities such as
municipalities -- require additional procedures. When dealing with a pension fund certain
disclosure requirements of ERISA may apply, and a knowledge of relevant statutes or
regulations may be required when dealing with public entities. Return to text
2. Similarly, KYC standards should be no different than those applicable to private banking
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accounts when the institution deals with a financial adviser or other type of intermediary
acting on behalf of a client. In order to perform its KYC responsibilities, the institution
should identify the beneficial owner of the account (usually the intermediary's client, but, in
rare cases, the intermediary itself) and perform its KYC analysis with respect to the
beneficial owner. The imposition of an intermediary between the institution and the counter
party should not lessen the private bank's KYC responsibilities. Return to text
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The Capture of Corruption: Complexity and Corporate Culture
“Corruption is often discussed in the kinds of language and symbolism
reserved for life-threatening diseases’1. This is problematic as no-one seems to have
found a definition which is universally agreed. Nor is there absolute consensus on
what types of behaviour within a loose definition are harmful. Johnson, however,
argues that in some respects there is “too much consensus. The new wave of concern
has been driven primarily by business and by international aid and lending
institutions. While there is nothing inherently wrong with that, their vision of
corruption, like any other, is partial.”2 Johnson points out that the major anticorruption players (USAID, World Bank, OECD, UNDP and TI)3 rarely address
differences in the societies whose corruption they seek to cure. Noting the way in
which corruption and ant-corruption has emerged on to the international agenda,
Samson notes; “In the last five or six years, anti-corruption practices have diffused
transnationally and have become organised globally. We have seen the emergence of
a world of anti-corruption with its own actors, strategies, resources and practices,
with its heroes, victims and villains”4 Samson moots two possible explanations for
this powerful recent emergence of the anti-corruption movement “The fight against
corruption is virtuous, and those who form part of the anti-corruption community’ are
thus ‘integrity warriors’. The second explanation focuses on the need to increase
system rationality; fighting corruption, it is “argued, will make market economies
more efficient, state administration more effective, and development resources more
accessible.”5 Pointing out that when anti-corruption norms are applied to projects
“’global morality’ [becomes] . . . a social process. It is a process by which virtue is
transformed into a specific activity called a project- one which includes formulating a
funding strategy, approaching donors, analysing stakeholders, hiring consultants,
developing NGOs, conducting project appraisals, making evaluations . . . Anticorruptionism . . . is a stage in which moral projects are intertwined with money and
power.”6 Because of this “Anti-corruption . . . is not innocent. It can be manipulated
to serve the interest of even the most unscrupulous actors.”7
Further, the interdependence of world economies makes the condemnation of
certain behaviours one-sided; that is, the behaviour of one set of actors is condemned
while those on the other side of the transaction are regarded with complacence. This
paper argues that such a system operates in certain tax havens, and will spotlight the
British Virgin Islands to put detail on a complex moral phenomenon.
1

M. Johnson’ Political Corruption’, Colgate University 2003.
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3
United States Agency for International Development, Organisation for Economic Development and
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4
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5
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The British Virgin Islands are a tiny group of islands composed of the remains
of a volcano. As such they are mountainous and have very poor soil. With 20,000
inhabitants in such a location making a living is extremely difficult. Moreover, the
islands have a troubled history ‘The English ousted the Dutch from Tortola in 1672,
and from Anegada and Virgin Gorda in 1680. The new rulers introduced the two
quintessential features of the colonial era in the Caribbean: sugar cane and slaves. At
first, most of Tortola's 'planters' were more interested in piracy and smuggling than
agriculture, but by the 18th century they were displaced by a new wave of
experienced planters and a settlement of hard working Quakers. Between the mid18th and early 19th centuries, the islands prospered, producing sugar, cotton, rum,
indigo and spices. Slave unrest and ideological doubt brought an end to slave auctions
in 1803. By the 1830s, slaves had been emancipated. Abolition and competing sugar
production in Europe and the USA were disastrous for the islands: capital and settlers
departed for more buoyant economies, and for the next 100 years the islands'
economy stagnated’8
The islands were desperately poor. Following in the footsteps of other
Caribbean Islands the Government established two industries which now earn 92% of
the BVI’s earnings split about equally between tourism and financial services.
However, the BVI was put on to the OECD list of corrupt economies and only
removed in 2002 having pledged to clean up money laundering. This paper raises
issues thrown up by this partnership between the culture of companies which have
established more than 400,000 ‘shell’ companies on the BVI, using it as an offshore
haven and the development aspirations of those living on the barren (but beautiful)
rocks which make up the BVI. As we will see the ‘public interest’ is often held to be
significant in definitions of corruption but the public interest is a complex
phenomenon, especially where cross-border issues are at stake.
Definitions of Corruption
The World Bank insists that it ‘has identified corruption as the single greatest
obstacle to economic and social development’9 One definition of corruption was put
forward by Edward Banfield in 1975. He described corruption as a relationship
between three parties: the public as principal, the public official as agent obligated to
fulfil the wishes of the principal, and a third party seeking to have the agent work on
their behalf instead.10 This is a simple description of corruption but, interestingly it is
apparently a bribe which takes place within a single jurisdiction. It contains an
assumption that the public official is being bribed to act against the interests of his
public. If we widen the description to take account of behaviour in (for simplicity)
8

Lonely Planet on-line guide
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10
E. Banfield ‘Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organisation’ Journal of Law and Economics
1975 18(3) 567-605.
9
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two jurisdictions we may have an instance where the definition does not bite; if the
condemned behaviour is approved of by the public in both jurisdictions, does the
corruption disappear? As a moral and legal issue the use of tax havens is problematic,
some would say inherently corrupt since it is clearly contrary to the beneficiaries of
taxation in the home state of the companies offshoring their activities However, it
would seem to benefit one other ‘public interest’ within that same jurisdiction; the
shareholders will receive greater profit and the share price will go up. This is at least
to their financial benefit.The third ‘public interest’ resides in the tax haven. Especially
on such unpromising volcanic soil as the BVI, how else to develop? Tourism has
natural limits; financial skulduggery has none? If the scheme benefits two ‘public’
and disadvantages one, do we vote for majority rule? And if so, why was the BVI on
the list of ‘corrupt’ tax havens when it was being used by many companies in rich
jurisdictions to increase their profits? Definitions which restrict corruption to public
officials run the risk of being accused of ‘capture’ of the concept, that is, used
selectively to condemn behaviour in order to achieve particular policy outcomes. It
misses altogether the institutional corruption which is to be found in the aggressive,
deregulated corporate sector in scenarios such as that in Enron and Worldcom. It
should be remembered that Arthur Anderson were indicted inter alia for ‘knowingly,
intentionally and corruptly’ inducing employees to shred documents relating to Enron.
Shore and Haller are clear that such financial scandals “remind us that Europeans and
Americans cannot assume that grand corruption is something that belongs primarily to
the non-western ‘Other’ or to public-sector officials in defective state bureaucracies:
corruption (both massive and systemic) we should not be surprised to learn, can also
be found in the very heart of the regulated world capitalist system.”11 This seems to
have been missed by the World Bank whose definition is ‘the abuse of public office
for private gain’12.
Corruption as a Moral Deflection Device?
Thomas Pogge explains the ability of rational humans to shape their thinking
to suit their interests; “moral norms, designed to protect the livelihood and dignity of
the vulnerable, place burdens on the strong. If such norms are compelling enough, the
strong make an effort to comply. But they also, consciously or unconsciously, try to
get around the norms by arranging their social world so as to minimise their burdens
of compliance.”13 Pogge labels such avoidance techniques ‘moral deflection devices’
There are strong reasons for believing that ‘corruption is a ‘moral deflection
device’. It is certainly used as a ‘persuader’ by lobby groups with a particular agenda:
“Most corruption involves agents seeking favours from public officials. The larger the
D. Haller and C. Shore (eds) Corruption Pluto Press , London, 2005
World Bank 2002 The New Anticorruption Home Page www.worldbank-homepage.htm,
accessed 6/10/2006
13
Pogge world Poverty, p5
11
12
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realm of government, the greater the opportunity for such favours `to be granted. If
the government regulates trade, the corruption can play a part in allocating export or
import quotas. If the government does not regulate trade there are no such
opportunities for preferment. . . But . . . certain enduring values seem to be more
important than the amount of government intervention in determining the level of
corruption (most notably personal honesty). What are we to make of the fact that there
are some relatively uncorrupt countries with very intrusive governments, such as in
Scananavia? . . . Can we create a virtuous `chain of events with less government
leading to less corruption and then to a better functioning of the expanded domain of
the market economy?”14 No surprise that the right wing, free market Institute of
Economic Affairs would like to argue de-regulation of companies and a smaller State
if only the inconvenient evidence of the Scandanavians did not impede the argument.
Neild takes a more balanced approach, examining the emergence of ‘clean
government’ in northwestern Europe15 in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
which by no means went hand in hand with less government and pointing out the
dangers of the reduction of government; “a policy of trying in a heavily governed
country to reduce the scope of government, and hence the number of rules that have to
be enforced, may be accompanied by denigration of the public service and by cuts in
its pay and conditions of such severity that, in combination with an idealization of
private gain, it may produce an increase rather than a decrease in the rate of
corruption. Russia today is an example.”16However, at least corruption can be used by
such lobbyists as an argument to restrict aid; “The most effective way of putting
international pressure on corrupt, pauper nations is for aid to be available only to
those that are demonstrably rooting out corruption. Countries with corrupt
governments should be excluded from all aid programmes and soft loans. Their
international debts should not be cancelled”17 As Haller and Shore note the main
structural approaches to corruption have colonialist overtones; either by perceiving
corruption as a social pathology of ‘primitive’ nations or by measuring corruption
against concepts of ‘good governance’.18 “While advocates of this approach claim that
the concept of ‘good governance’ is based on neutral, objective and a-cultural values,
critics argue that it reinforces the hegemonic values of the West as universalprecisely by defining them as ‘above’ the realm of politics and culture”19 A similar
problem lies with the Banfield approach noted above, the concept of harm to the
public interest being a notably slippery concept. In particular Haller and Shore point
to the complex nature of the public-private distinction which is fundamental to many
approaches to corruption; “In the conventional political science approach, as in
neoliberal ideology and in Transparency International initiatives, it is the violation of
this public/private distinction by individuals that fundamentally defines corrupt
behaviour. Corruption is thus viewed as a measure of how well a society distinguishes
between public and private spheres.”20 Further the distinction between gifts and bribes
is an incoherent one in some cultures. Overall “Neoliberalism has set the frame for
analytical models of corruption, particularly in its restrictive World Bank definition of
P. Booth Foreword in I. Senior Corruption- The World’s Big C Institute of Economic Affairs,
London, 2006
15
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in Contemporary Politics, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2003.
16
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corruption as the abuse of ‘public’ office. Stripped to its basics, the neoliberal thesis
holds that since corruption is primarily a pathology of the public sector, the solution
lies in reducing public spending and rolling back the frontiers of the state . Shrinking
the public sector, so the argument goes, reduces the scope for public officials to
engage in malfeasance. It also subjects public officials to the regulatory disciplines of
the market, to cost-consciousness, and to entrepreneurial business ethics. To focus on
corporate crimes and corruption within the private sector is simply not on the current
agenda of the US government or the IMF.”21 However it is, in a limited sense, on the
agenda of TI which, following the Enron scandal, expanded its operations and
definition of corruption from ‘abuse by public officials for private gain’ to abuse of
entrusted power’ for private gain’. The limitations of this latter definition restrict the
discussion to the ‘bad apple’ theory of corporate corruption, much favoured in the
Barings and Enron cases which argued that it was identifiable, corrupt individuals
which caused the problem rather than an underlying corrupt culture.22
As Thomas Pogge points out the belief that corruption is a ‘pathology of
primitive nations’ is common to ‘many citizens of the affluent countries’ who hold
that the global economic order is not to blame for severe poverty and increasing
global inequality; rather “poverty is substantially caused not by global, systemic
factors, but – in the countries where it occurs – by their flawed national economic
regimes and by their corrupt and incompetent elites, both of which impede national
economic growth and a fairer distribution of the national product.”23 This comforting
belief is accompanied by demands that the poor countries must first help themselves
by giving themselves respectable political regimes. Since, until imposition of regime
change in Iraq, it is not the responsibility of rich nations to impose regimes on others,
nothing can be done. Aid, if given, would only be lost to corrupt elites. However these
comfortable beliefs “are nevertheless ultimately unsatisfactory, because it portrays the
corrupt social institutions and corrupt elites prevalent in the poor countries as an
exogenous fact: as a fact that explains, but does not itself stand in need of
explanation.”24 The prevalence of bad regimes itself requires an explanation. By way
of providing an explanation, Pogge focuses on the extraordinary double standards
applied to a gang of thieves overpowering the guards at a warehouse and stealing the
contents as opposed to a group overpowering an elected government. The latter (but
not the former) become owners of the contents able to dispose of the natural resources
of the country, transferring ownership to the buyers and are able to borrow freely
(international resource privilege). Thus “Indifferent to how governmental power is
acquired, the international resource privilege provides powerful incentives toward
coup attempts and civil wars in the resource-rich countries. Consider Nigeria, for
instance, where oil exports of $6-$10 billion annually constitute roughly a quarter of
GDP. Whoever takes power there, by whatever means, can count on this revenue
stream to enrich himself and to cement his rule. This is quite a temptation for military
officers, and during 28 of the past 32 years Nigeria has indeed been ruled by military
strongmen who took power and ruled by force. Able to buy means of repression
abroad and support from other officers at home, such rulers were not dependant on
popular support and thus made few productive investments towards stimulating
poverty eradication or even economic growth.”25 The failure to alter the prevalence of
D. Haller and C.Shore, Corruption, p18.
For a further discussion of this see below, especially the work of MacLennan.
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corruption under Olusegun Obasanjo “has provoked surprise. But it makes sense
against the background of the international resource privilege: Nigeria’s military
officers know well that they can capture the oil revenues by overthrowing Obasanjo.
An expose of the way in which companies, states, Codes of conduct and explanatory
nationalism all work together has been provided by Global Witness.26 They report that
in Congo Brazzaville, Angola and Equatorial Guinea huge sums of oil and extractive
revenues have vanished from sight, paid as bribes by the companies to the local elites.
This is despite the voluntary disclosure code launched by the UK Government in
2003. A UK Government spokesperson explained that it was for the governments of
these countries to stamp out corruption. Global witness had suggested preventing
parent companies from listing on the FTSE , Dow Jones or Bourse (or any powerful
country’s Stock Exchange) unless companies were transparent about these sums of
money. The UK Government spokesperson explained that this was not possible since
laws would have to be passed in all the countries where the mining companies were
registered.27 This is a manifest inaccuracy, since EU rules and US rules would cover
most of the operations and the stock exchange of Angola has, to say the least, a low
profile in world affairs, but it displaces the burden to act on to the corrupt
governments. Manifestly a recipe of appeasement of the companies by smoke and
mirrors while apparently ‘tackling the problem’.28 It is noteworthy in this context that
‘corruption indices’ always rate countries by the frequency of receipt of bribes, never
the source of the bribes29. It takes two to be corrupt and in this instance the bribes
were coming from the west. It is therefore necessary to consider much more carefully
the definitions of corruption that we use. Rejecting the orthodox definition of
corruption, Kleinig and Heffernan argue that “it relies on the superficial clarity of a
private/public destinction and an unexamined view of what counts as proper use”30
Arguing that corruption is by nature “essentially contestable” both as to its definition
and its desirability, they make the important point that “Corruption is not the
exclusive failing of public officers; there may also be personal corruption, corrupt
institutions, and corrupt cultures”31It is suggested here that the culture which has
grown up in some of our largest and most powerful multinationals is a corrupt culture
which merits as much attention as ‘public’ corruption and may often be a contributory
factor in the development of other corruptions including illegal or marginally legal
offshore financing. Euben argues from the basis of the Oxford English Dictionary
which associates corruption with a cluster of words-decay, degeneration,
disintegration, and debasement.”32 This much wider definition opens up an
investigation into corporate culture. We need to investigate what has changed about
corporate culture which can be so described.
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Companies and Corruption
. MacLennan traces the rots of the current waves of corporate corruption in America
to early industrialisation; the inevitable and fundamental conflict between the
emergent values of market capitalism and democratic goals to protect the public
interest.”33 MacLennan argues that this conflict was met by a network of regulations
creating an American ‘welfare state’ which “not only provides a social safety net for
the disadvantage in the economy, but also welfare for the very rich and their
corporations.34 Examining why this system seems to have failed so spectacularly over
recent years, MacLennan advances the argument that, while the regulatory system is
based on the idea that regulation is needed only during “moments of business
failure”35, the clash of values runs deeper as “Market values, which have their root in
a pre-industrial, liberal society based upon democratic citizenship and agrarian, small
business enterprises , have morphed into a new ethic of corporate capitalism which no
longer resembles the business culture of the past.. . . Corporate behaviour in the US
has become increasingly ‘corrupt’ and the behaviour of officials in the Enrons and
Worldcoms is not isolated. . . . it is pervasive and institutionalised. That means, it is
more than criminal behaviour by a few bad actors in an otherwise clean enterprise. It
is institutionalised in the everyday world-view and processes of corporate action.”36
MacLennan’s study is into the close networks which link the political and economic
elites but also notes that “ Definitions of morality, public interest and personal
responsibility in corporate board rooms and executive offices may in fact be quite
different from those of the rest of the middle, working and poor classes.”37 An
interesting example of this is Skilling’s belief that he is entirely innocent of
wrongdoing. This is unlikely to be mere denial and may well stem from an unholy
mixture of the ‘Alpha male entitlement’ syndrome which leads powerful people (not
always males to refuse to believe that the rules of ordinary life apply to them and by
the fact that by constantly driving up the share price he believes that he was doing
precisely the job that the company required in accordance with its aggressive market
forces culture. MacLennan insists that “corruption implies something systematic,
institutionalised and perhaps endemic to an organisation or culture. It is pervasive,
infused or embedded in the system.. . Corrupt or criminal behaviour is individual. If
an alleged crime occurs, individuals are held responsible and receive punishment
through the courts. But corruption is institutional, patterened – perhaps criminal and
unethical from outside, but not necessarily perceived as such by insiders All of the
attention to the individual criminal executive is a detaour from figuring out how
corruption works. An example is the coverage of the prosecution of Enron’s
executives, CEO Jeffery Skilling and Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow. All
eyes are on the courtroom . . . and on possible jail sentences – thus isolating the
executive as the criminal. The corporate culture that bred corruption, and the social
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expectations of the elite that ruled the organisation, have escaped scrutiny”38Let us
look at some instances of the Enron culture as translated into action by Skilling;
“Skilling introduced a rigorous employee performance assessment process that
became known as ‘rank or yank’ under this system the bottom 10 per cent in
performance were shown the door. There was heavy pressure to meet targets, and
remuneration was linked to the deals done and profits booked in the previous
quarter.”39
“One thing the traders all loved about Enron was the sense they had of operating in
the purest environment that had ever been created in corporate America. By pure, they
meant that the trading floor operated strictly by the dictates of the free market. The
company’s credo had always been that free markets worked best, of course. But the
traders grabbed on to that belief with a cult-like fierceness. . . Maximising profit was
not inconsistent with doing good, they believed, but an inherent part of it. . .”40
“And always, hovering over everything and everyone at Enron, was Wall Street. . . .
In the Skilling era, the stock became . . . Enron’s obsession. A stock ticker in the
headquarter’s lobby offered a constant update on the price of Enron shares. TV
monitors broadcast CNBC in the building elevators. . . for Skilling himself . . . ‘the
stock price was his report card’. When it rose, he was exultant; when it dropped , he
was glum”41
“Skilling’s methods of arriving at Enron’s quarterly and annual targets was downright
perverse. Instead of going through a rigorous budget process and arriving at a number
by analyzing all the business units and their prospects for the coming year as Kinder
used to do, he would impose a number based solely on what Wall Street wanted. He
would openly ask the stock analysts “What earnings do you need to keep our stock
price up?” And the number he arrived at was the number Wall Street was looking for,
regardless of whether internally it made good sense. . . . Invariably, as the quarter
drew to a close, Enron’s top executives would realize that they were going to fall
short of the number they’d promised Wall Street. . .. when the realisation took place
that the company was falling short, its executives undertook a desperate scramble to
fill the holes in the company’s earnings.”42
A similar corruption was evident in the fall of Barings. The lack of supervision
of Nick Leeson was attributable in a substantial degree to the feeling that he was ‘the
goose’ laying the golden eggs so that stringent enquiries into his activities or
limitation of them should be avoided at all costs.
In a brief investigation of corporate culture, MacLennan notes the prevalence
of “shared corporate values predicated on the rights of property and the rule of
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the market”43 Let us look more carefully into property rights and market
assumptions.
The US/UK model of companies and corporate law has shareholders as
the primary focus; the company must serve the interests of shareholders and
directors are appointed and dismissed by shareholders. Nevertheless directors
are to act in the interest of the company and usually owe no direct duties to
shareholders. This structure does not necessarily equate shareholders with the
company nor does it equate shareholder interests with ‘profit maximisation’
and impose a duty on directors to achieve such a goal. Nevertheless recent
discourse has imposed the concept of profit maximisation on the assumption
that this is what shareholders require and the second assumption that
shareholders and the company are one and the same thing. Such an
understanding of corporate aims has wide implications for their behaviour
since all considerations other than profit are seen as ‘negative externalities’ to
be adhered to or to be bargained away if possible. There is no doubt that this
philosophy was one of the underlying causes of spectacular bankruptcies such
as Enron and WorldCom (see further discussion of this below). In terms of
moral responsibility such a construct of corporations means that they become
another method of moral deflection: because the purpose of corporations is to
make as much money as possible those who tolerate and profit from their
existence have no responsibility for the methods they pursue. This ignores the
fact not only that companies are structured by national laws but also that those
who profit from an activity have a responsibility to prevent that activity
harming others. However, offshore financing muddies the water since, as
noted above we have at least three different competing interest groups which
may each claim to represent the ‘public interest’.
‘Free Markets’ and neo-classical economics
The Enron vision of free markets was based on neo-classical economics. It is
therefore important to examine closely foundation concepts of this thinking to
understand how norms have emerged from the analysis. A key concept is ‘efficiency’, a
term which also has emotive power. Who has ever heard of a government asking
advisers to formulate an inefficient economic policy? However, notions of the
measurement of efficiency vary. Pareto efficiency requires that someone gains and no
one loses. However, the Kaldor-Hicks test accepts as efficient “a policy which results
in sufficient benefits for those who gain such that potentially they can compensate
fully all the losers and still remain better off”44
The neo-classical economists believe that rational actors utilising perfect
information will produce maximum allocative efficiency by making choices which
exploit competition in the market. In plain English that means that everyone is
assumed to be equally rational, have equal bargaining power and that there is no
asymmetry of information. Stiglitz explains the theories thus: “One of the great
intellectual achievements of the mid-twentieth century . . . was to establish the
conditions under which Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ worked. These included a
43
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large number of unrealistic conditions, such as that information was either perfect, or
at least not affected by anything going on in the economy, and that whatever
information anybody had, others had the same information; that competition was
perfect; and that one could buy insurance against any possible risk. Though everyone
recognised that these assumptions were unrealistic, there was a hope that if the real
world did not depart too much from such assumptions – if information were not too
imperfect, or firms did not have too much market power – then Adam Smith’s
invisible hand theory would still provide a good description of the economy. This was
a hope based more on faith – especially by those whom it served well – than on
science. My research, and that of others, on the consequences of asymmetric
information . . . has shown that one of the reasons that the invisible hand may be
invisible is that it is simply not there.”45
Since the invisible hand is not to be fettered, State regulations should be
removed so that a ‘free market’ is permitted to reach maximum efficiency. However,
de-regulation distorts the concept of freedom by removing regulation which seeks to
protect the vulnerable; trade union law, employment regulation, environmental
legislation. Freedom to trade in this sense becomes someone else’s lack of freedom. It
is notable that he slave traders defended their practices on the basis that they must be
allowed ‘free trade’.
It must be noted that any identified defect in the underlying assumptions tends
to have a cumulative effect, each building block contributing to a picture which
emphasises the necessity for a market free of regulatory interference, disguising the
reality of imbalances of power which might be addressed by regulation. The basis of
the theories on a pseudo-scientific notion of efficiency and the claim that creating
wealth is beneficial for society as a whole means that the end result is a picture where
interference with the freedom of markets needs to be justified by anyone who argues
for any regulation of market behaviour. It is important to note that Enron rose in the
context of de-regulation of the utilities industries and of the accountancy profession.
Take first the Kaldor-Hicks notion of efficiency. The concept that net gains
and losses need to be calculated and any net gain to any party is equivalent to
efficiency is open to “several powerful objections, at least as a conclusive criterion of
social welfare”46 Ogus points to the coercive imposition of losses on individuals, the
assumption that one unit of money is of equal value whoever owns it and its hostility
to the notion of distributive justice. Ogus gives the following example;47
“Suppose that the policymaker had to choose between (A) a policy that increased
society’s wealth by $1million and benefited the poor more than the rich, and (B) a
policy that increased its wealth by $2million, the bulk of which devolved on the rich?
Many would argue for (A) on the grounds of fairness48 but (B) would be considered to
be superior in Kaldor-Hicks terms. 49
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Now, if we see this argument in the light of Marx’s views on equality and the
concept of freedom we can see how the approach is based on the idea of “notional
equality” of the Kantian and Hegelian kind and how clearly Marx saw the reality that
given real inequalities which pre-date the time of the transaction, inequalities will not
only persist but become more and more accentuated. The Pareto-Hicks formula does
not insist that the winning individuals and the losing individuals should be different in
different transaction; in practice the powerful become more powerful, the poor more
poor and disadvantaged. O. Lange writes50 “let us imagine two persons: one who has
learned his economics only from the Austrian School, Pareto and Marshall, without
having seen or even heard a sentence of Marx or his disciples; the other one who, on
the contrary, knows his economics exclusively from Marx and the Marxists . . . Which
of the two will be able to account better for the fundamental tendencies of the
evolution of Capitalism?” resolving the question in favour of the Marxists. 51 Lange
also makes the contrast between Marx’s theory of economic “evolution” and the fact
that “for modern ‘bourgeois’ economics the problem of economic evolution belongs
not to economic theory but to economic history”52. This static nature may be seen as
flowing from the essentially moral emptiness of current economic theory; unlike
Marxism it is not driven by a desire to achieve freedom and fulfilment of a spiritual
nature. 53
Deregulation, Market failure, corporate governance and failures to fulfil human
rights
The call for regulatory structures to re-balance the company’s focus on
shareholders so that it serves to deliver a more just economic outlook is in line with an
understanding of human rights which moves away from a traditional focus on limiting
the behaviour of the state and its officials and focuses instead on human rights as
imposing duties on individuals to build institutions which lead to as full a delivery of
human rights as possible.54 One of these institutions is the capitalist market. There is a
good case for applying the concept of institution building to situations where there is
market failure and making the case for regulations to try to correct the market failure
so far as possible.
“But for the market economy to function well, there is a need for laws and
regulations – to ensure fair competition, to protect the environment, to make sure that
consumers and investors are not cheated.”55 Stiglitz examines the ways in which
deregulation in the United States in the 1990s was instrumental in assisting the
economic ‘bubble’ to grow and then burst and the spectacular bankruptcies and
revelation of fraud that followed. “Regulations help restrain conflicts of interest and
abusive practices, so that investors can be confident that the market provides a level
"Marxian Economics and Modern Economic Theory" in Marx and Modern Economics", S. Horowitz
(ed), Macgibbon & Key, London 1968.
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playing field and that those who were supposed to be acting in their interests actually
do so. But the flip side of this is that regulation restrains profits and so deregulation
means more profits. And in the nineties, those who saw the larger profits that
deregulation would bring were willing to invest to get it – willing to spend megabucks
in campaign contributions and lobbyists.”56 So far as corporate governance is
concerned, market failure occurred by failure to regulate competition adequately, by
permitting banks and accountancy firms to merge and take on tasks which inevitably
involved conflicts of interest and by using perverse incentives as part of the rewards
packages for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs).57 Competition regulation failure came
partly from the argument that the ‘New Economy’ had arrived, that it provided new
conditions where innovations would keep competition healthy so regulation was not
necessary. Stiglitz was not convinced. Analysing the telecommunications market he
writes; “There were two reasons that I was suspicious of those who simply said ‘Let
competition reign’. The first [was] . . . everyone talked about the importance of being
the first mover into a market. In doing so, they were, in effect, admitting that they did
not anticipate sustained competition. There would be competition for the market, but
not competition in the market. That, in fact, was why those who had a head start in the
race were lobbying so hard: they thought they had the inside track, and the payoff, if
they won, would be enormous. . . But secondly, why, if the local phone companies
really thought that competition would break out, were they so resistant to efforts to
make sure that there was strong anti-trust oversight?”58
The second significant failure lay in permitting accountancy and banking firms
to merge into huge giants carrying out activities which were clearly in conflict of
interest. Thus accountants were making huge profits by carrying on consultancies for
firms whose accounts they were supposed to be auditing and banks were
simultaneously lending money to firms such as Enron, while also undertaking the
placing of Initial Public Offers (IPOs) of shares with the public. The independent
assessment of the lending branch of the bank as to the creditworthiness of the firm
was likely to be undermined by the wish of the investment branch to do business
issuing shares for the firm. This removed an important device for monitoring the
solvency of the company and gave false signals. If the bank is still lending investors
would believe that the firm was still solvent. Loans were granted to Enron until the
last moment before the scandal broke and such loans only increased the size of the
eventual shortfall for employee pension schemes as well as investors.
A third significant failure was “the strange corporate practice of giving corporate
executives stock options – the right to buy company stock at below market prices –
and then pretending that nothing of value had changed hands.”59 These transactions
were not adequately disclosed. The importance of this is clear to Stiglitz: “As a
longtime student of the role of information in a well-functioning economy, I
[understood that] . . . the executives are being paid too much partly because it isn’t
widely known exactly how much they are really being paid. And if no one knows how
much the CEOs are being paid, that means no one knows how much profit (or loss)
the company is making. No one knows how much the firm is really worth. Without
this information, prices cannot perform the roles they are supposed to in guiding
investment. As economists put it somewhat technically ‘resource allocations will be
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distorted.”60 Further, compensation packages for CEOs ran out of control with boards
accepting huge increases and shareholders unable to prevent the packages going
through. “While senior executive compensation rose 36 percent in 1998 over 1997,
the wages of the average blue-collar worker rose just 2.7 percent in the same period. .
. . Even in 2001, a disaster year for profits and stock prices, executive CEO pay
increased twice as fast as the pay of the average worker.”61 And you can be sure that it
was not a percentage calculated from equivalent pay at the outset. Stiglitz understands
the cause of the downturn of the US economy as being significantly caused by these
factors which were all brought on by deregulation and a failure to understand the
correct role of regulation in preventing or minimising market failures. And, market
failures impact most significantly on the poorest in the community and are likely to
directly cause non or underfulfillment of human rights. The imperative is to prevent
perverse incentives and competition failures from so distorting the market that it fails.
We must be on guard against the simplistic economic viewpoint which is analysed
above since it is still endemic in many policy think-tanks and government advisors all
over the world. Deakin argues that “We have acquired a framework of perverse
incentives that rewards most those managers who are best at shifting risks and
liabilities on to the under-represented within the corporation (mainly employees) and
in society at large. This is the result of entrenching a particular version of the
“shareholder value” norm, associated with short-run share price maximisation, in
corporate culture and practice.62
Companies as Property
Paddy Ireland has made it clear that companies fit with difficulty into the
property rights discourse.63 This is because the traditional ‘take’ on companies is that
they are ‘the property of the shareholders’ or “ in the ‘nexus of contracts’ or ‘agency’
theory of the company, in what amounts to the same thing, that the shareholders own
not ‘the company’ but ‘the capital’, the company itself having been spirited out of
existence.64 Ireland also shows that there is considerable convergence between the
property rights of creditors and those of shareholders, each can be seen as essentially
‘outsiders’ having contractual rights against the company, rather than ‘insiders’ with
membership rights. The remaining ‘insider’ rights of shareholders are relics of the
time when joint-stock companies were run by members and of an even earlier time
when lending for interest was banned but partnership for profit was not. An
investment as a ‘sleeping partner’ was a convenient way to circumvent this rule.
The shareholder value norm itself rests on the ‘myth of shareholder
ownership’, that this ‘myth’ is a rhetoric appealing to the concept of ‘property’ as an
important right which has distorted our understanding of companies and of directors’
duties by accepting that the gap between ‘ownership and control’ should be plugged
by duties designed to align the interests of directors with those of shareholder-owners.
Because this structure is based on the myth of ownership it is unhelpful and distorting,
leaving out of account many of the real risks which companies run, risks of damage to
the company by poor treatment of employees, the environment and consumers leading
Stiglitz Roaring Nineties p118, italics in the original.
Stiglitz Roaring Nineties p124
62
S. Deakin Squaring the Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility (2002)70
Geo Wash LR 976at 977
63
P. Ireland “Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership” 1999 MLR 62, See also J. Hill
“Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder” (2000) American Journal of Comparative Law 39.
64
Ireland, Myth of Shareholder Ownership.
60
61

Create PDF with GO2PDF for free, if you wish to remove this line, click here to buy Virtual PDF Printer

to leading not only to loss of reputation but to the real danger of collapse from striving
for a short-term goal of shareholder value maximisation at the expense of
sustainability and long-term goals. As we have seen, although greed motivated some
of the fraud which was important in the downfall of Enron, one of the most important
motivating factors was a desire to keep the share price rising. “I don’t want us ever to
be satisfied with a stock price; it should always be higher . . . Indeed, we still think
that over the next several months that there’s a good chance that the stock price could
be up as much as 50 percent, and I think there’s no reason to think that over the next
two years we can’t double it again”65
There is, however, room for optimism; “For almost a quarter century,
beginning in the early seventies, the rational expectations school of economic thought
dominated economic thinking. This portrayed the individual not only as a rational
being, making consistent choices, but as someone capable of processing complex
information and absorbing all the relevant knowledge. Its advocates focused on
models in which everyone had the same information – there were no asymmetries. In
fact, few people know enough math to process even the range of knowledge bearing
on the simplest investment decision. (the rational expectations theorists conceded as
much, yet asserted that, somehow, individuals acted as if they had processed it all.
Not content with upholding the rationality of individuals, they portrayed the economy
itself as a rational mechanism – one in which, miraculously, prices reflect
instantaneously everything that is known today, and prices today reflect a consistent
set of expectations about what prices will be infinitely far into the future. The political
agenda of this work often seemed barely beneath the surface: if the rational
expectations school was right, markets were inherently efficient, and there would be
little if any need, ever, for government intervention. The heyday of the rational
expectations movement has ended, I am pleased to report.”66 It is most notable that
the most fervent believers of this creed have profited from it (at least until they have
gone to prison), a clear example of Pogge’s understanding that human beings prefer to
take comfort from beliefs that will favour themselves. The analysis also makes it plain
that building the market as an institution which will best deliver human rights is itself
a human rights responsibility.

New Uses for Concession Theory
Nowhere is there complete adherence to the theory that companies ought to be
permitted to function free of all regulation: all states operate a ‘mixed’ system of
market freedom and regulatory control.67 However, traditional discussions of
corporate governance give little weight to the web of regulation which surrounds
every corporate operation and, in particular; the impact of regulations on corporate
culture has not been examined in its legal context. Is the way in which companies
actually work reflected in discussions of corporate governance and an adequate legal
framework?
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The imposition of regulations may easily be justified by traditional
concessionary approaches: in its simplest form this approach views the existence and
operation of the company as a concession by the state, which grants the ability to
trade using the corporate tool, particularly where it operates with limited liability. In
return this concession implies the right to impose limits on a company’s freedom.68
The imposition of regulations inevitably identifies those at most risk from particular
corporate decisions and seeks to protect from or minimise that risk. Thus,
environmental regulation identifies whole communities as at risk, financial regulation
protects shareholders and health and safety regulation principally targets employees.
As Teubner rightly says:
“Putting it quite bluntly, a corporate enterprise does not exist simply as a self
serving and self-realizing institution for the unique benefits of its shareholders and
workers, but rather exists, above all, to fulfil a broader role in society.”69
Indeed, large companies have a huge on influence our social, economic and
political lives. In the words of Chayes, “[T]hey are repositories of power, the biggest
centers of nongovernmental power in our society.”70 In the UK the influence of
companies is just as evident as in the USA. The food we eat is dependent on how it is
grown, processed, packaged, advertised and sold to us. Every one of these stages is
determined or influenced by companies. Increasingly companies are involved in the
provision of public services with the government having created mechanisms such as
private finance initiatives, and more recently the proposals for community interest
companies. Such mechanisms are recognition of the influence of companies and their
role in society. In such a context it seems that the two company law assumptions that
share the structure of company law and corporate governance are not only
anachronistic but in fact wholly inaccurate in their representation of the character of
companies today. Teubner argues for a proceduralization of fiduciary duties that
enables non shareholder interest groups to participate in the monitoring and decisionmaking functions. The role of the law, in Teubner’s view should be to control
indirectly internal organizational structures, through external regulation. The role of
the law is external mobilisation of internal control resources.71 The organisational
structures should allow for “discursive unification processes as to allow the optimal
balancing of company performance and company function by taking into account the
requirements of the non-economic environment.” In short, Teubner advocates a
constitutionalization of the private corporation to make the corporate conscience work
“if that meant to force the organization to internalise outside conflicts in the decision
structure itself in order to take into account the non-economic interests of workers,
68
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consumers, and the general public.”72 Teubner highlights the role of disclosure, audit,
justification, consultation and negotiation and the duty to organise. He emphasises the
need to proceduralise. Ultimately the point is to ensure that the decision-making
processes allow participation by those affected by the decisions, whether in terms of
profit, consumer choice, working conditions or environmental impact of corporate
activities. If the decisions are made jointly with the directors the monitoring role
ought to reduce. Teubner’s proceduralisation would mean a complete change in
conceptualisation of the company and directors’ duties. The following tries to put
some flesh on the bones’ in the context of a new look at UK company law.
As we have seen, Berle and Means identified the separation of ownership and
control in the 1930s73, showing that, with dispersed ownership of shares, control of
corporations lay less with shareholders and more with the professional managers of
large companies. This led to corporate governance being discussed primarily as
involving antidotes to such a separation, and, in particular with implementing
mechanisms to align the managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Today there
is a second shift in the governance of companies, this time strengthening the degree of
separation between ownership and control and also shifting the focus and perhaps the
power centre of decision making to a lower level in the company. This second shift
calls into question the reality of the vision of a company exclusively directed by the
‘controlling minds’ of managers but by acknowledging that directors still have the
ultimate decision making power is in line with the reconceptualisation of a company
as owner; the directors are exercising their property rights powers on behalf of the
company. Limits on their decision making, however, appear by way of providing
them with information from throughout the organisation and insisting that the focus of
their decision making should be an assessment of risks to the organisation. This new
understanding would reject the idea of the company being composed solely of its
organs but, in some ways embrace the ‘organic’ view of companies.74 The organic
analysis is borrowed from the analysis of States. Wolff75 cites John Caspar Bluntschli
who ‘found something corresponding in the life of the State not only to every part of
the human body but even to every human emotion, and designated e.g. the foreign
relations of a State as its sexual impulses!’ In fact the organic theory is remarkably
wide in its vision, many current theories would omit the inclusion of the ‘hands’ at all,
regarding employees as ‘negative externalities’ rather than as an integral part of the
company’s existence.
There are a multiplicity of regulations that companies must implement and
within companies, systems are set up to implement them. A simple example (and the
most obvious) is the systems which must be set up to ensure financial control. In the
Barings collapse, one of the problems that was clearly identified was the lack of
knowledge of the derivatives operation which was displayed by the directors. They
were eventually disqualified as directors as being ‘unfit’ following their failure to put
in place proper systems of financial control. However, in order to create effective
systems they needed to fully familiarise themselves with the functioning of the
derivatives operation. It is argued here that, because detailed knowledge of the
operation of the systems which make up a functioning company are to be found
elsewhere than at board level and that proper systems of control cannot be designed
without this detailed knowledge, it is incumbent on the eventual decision makers to
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take account of the knowledge and experience of those most intimately involved in
the systems necessary to control the risks which are the subject matter of the
regulations.
This is not to say that the power to take the eventual decision has moved, but
that proper decisions cannot be made without wide consultation. This, in turn, gives
the consultees standing to influence the decision making process and, in particular,
change the culture of the company from focussing on shareholder profit alone.
The example of financial controls is just a single example of the regulations
which impinge on decision making within companies. The company must remain
within the criminal law and must have systems which ensure that this happens. This
may extend to ensuring consistency between methods of working and achievable
targets. For example if time targets for repairs to electric signals on a railway cannot
be achieved without electricians working excessively long hours, the inconsistency
may in future be identified as a reason for holding the company (and its directors)
criminally responsible for an ensuing disaster. Similarly proper systems for
implementation of health and safety and environmental regulations must rely on
detailed knowledge of the ‘way things actually work’.
In effect, the imposition of regulations which must be implemented, gives the
company a greater degree of autonomy from the shareholders. As we have seen, the
‘shareholder property rights’ model led to a narrow definition of what is meant by
‘Corporate Governance’ with most commentators concerned only with the methods
by which management action can be controlled in order to ensure management
behaviour ‘for the benefit of the company’, meaning in the vast majority of situations,
for the financial benefit of shareholders. This tendency has been reinforced by the
‘legal boxes’ which have been constructed, particularly in common law jurisdictions.
‘Company law’ is seen as a separate discipline from ‘labour law’, ignoring the fact of
enormous proportions that the huge majority of employees work for companies and
that companies cannot work without employees. Similarly, other regulatory structures
impinge on corporate decision making so that it is no longer open to the shareholders
to insist on profit at the expense of compliance with health and safety standards,
environmental regulations76 or consultation with employees. Nor can systems to
ensure compliance with criminal law be neglected.
In the recent US scandals, particularly those like ENRON and WORLDCOM
which involve manipulating accounts in order to maintain inflated share prices we see
a conflict between the old fashioned view of ‘corporate governance’ which sought to
create mechanisms for aligning the governance of the company with shareholders’
interest in profit maximisation and the vision described here which seeks, by
regulation, to make sure that companies have proper systems in place to ensure their
compliance with the requirements of society generally. Although it is true that
directors of these companies stood to gain personally from inflated share prices, the
primary motive for the ‘creative accounting’ was the pressure to do better than
competitors so far as a continuously rising share price was concerned. The system of
corporate governance which relies primarily on shareholder enforcement is shown not
only to be inadequate but counterproductive, imposing pressures which are
destructive of both the company and the wider interests of society, both in loss of faith
in markets and destruction of, e.g. pension benefits.
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Conclusion
However, even if such reforms were to lead to a more sustainable, socially
responsible and less corrupt corporate culture this will not solve the conundrum of the
‘corruption’ of offshore tax havens. If reformed companies decided that shareholder
value was not the sole determinant of their behaviour would they desert offshore
financing? And if so, what would happen to the development potential of the ex-slave
colonies which currently rely on it? Pogge would undoubtedly point to a duty to
support the development of previously exploited peoples. What should replace the
easy income from invisible companies?
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Countering bribery in Switzerland
Andre Odermatt
Countering international and national bribery is a primary issue for Switzerland as
Switzerland actively participated in the evaluation of the conventions of the OECD, the
European Council and UNO and actively promotes its implementation and application.
Moreover, countering bribery is important for Switzerland in terms of international
cooperation and development.
In Switzerland, active and passive bribery as well as the acceptance or the offer of
improper benefits, e.g. gifts, are criminal offences.
Active bribery is the offer of a bribe to induce a public officer to carry out a particular
action while passive bribery is a request for or acceptance of bribery for a certain action
by a public officer. In addition, the Swiss Criminal Code covers the offer and acceptance
of improper benefits (such as gifts) both for as yet undefined actions as well as for
anticipated actions that are possibly to be taken by officials in future.
A public official is defined as a member of a tribunal or other public authority, a public
servant, an expert in public office, a translator, an arbitrator or a member of the army as
well as a private person serving in public office.
Natural persons are primarily liable for bribery and they are then prosecuted for
committing a criminal offence. If a bribe is committed by an enterprise, it is not only
management that is liable but also all those persons who represent the enterprise.
According to legislation, enterprises that fail to maintain a proper form of organisation in
order to avoid charges of bribery are liable and can be penalized.
In 2006, new legislation under the “Law against unfair competition” came into force
according to which the bribing of private persons (and not only of public officials) is a
criminal offence. Whereas any persons offering a bribe are liable, the victim of a bribe is
only legally responsible if he or she has a particularly confidential relationship with an
enterprise. Therefore, that person must either be an employee, an assignee, a shareholder
of an enterprise or a person otherwise closely related to an enterprise.
It goes without saying that corruption, once established, is also subject to the Swiss law
against money laundering because money involved and transferred in connection with
bribes has its origins in a “crime” and will thus be pursued by law.
In turn, the fight against bribery not only requires a legal framework. It clearly needs the
commitment of enterprises working together to combat bribery. These companies must
establish good corporate governance and a clear code of conduct, which not only give
guidelines but also address the issue of sanctions.
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In cooperation with Transparency International (TI), leading international banks such as
ABN AMRO, Barclays, Chase, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Credit Suisse and the
UBS, among others, found common agreement regarding the countering of money
laundering and corruption. Q.v. www.wolfsberg-principles.com .
One major initiative has been started by large industrial companies together with TI at the
World Economic Forum with Principles against Corruption (PACI). Q.v.
www.weforum.org . The vision is zero tolerance where bribery and corruption are
concerned.
Achieving zero tolerance on the part of all the persons involved requires total
commitment. A practical test might help, such as:
•
•
•

Would my supervisor agree to such an action, once he heard about it?
Would I agree to have such actions reported in the news?
Is my counterpart who accepts any benefits acting in accordance with his
employer’s “code of conduct”?

If all these questions can be answered positively, then you can have your actions
approved by your supervisor and you can file the facts relating to this action. You should
desist if any question receives a negative answer.
Or follow Sir Peter Ustinov’s statement: “If I tip a waiter after the meal, then it’s not
bribery. If I tip him before the meal, then that’s bribery.”
André Odermatt, LGT Trust Limited, Vaduz, Principality of Liechtenstein
andre.odermatt@lgt.com

Create PDF with GO2PDF for free, if you wish to remove this line, click here to buy Virtual PDF Printer

